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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTAION

ANALYSIS OF AUTOMATIC JUDGMENTS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
The measurement of religious belief has some social desirability concerns that make
the development of an implicit measure of religiosity advantageous. Currently, there are few
options for implicitly measuring religious belief. This study attempted to add to this
literature by analyzing the automatic judgements of religious belief through the use of an
implicit measure known as the MouseTrack task, allowing for the measurement of latency in
the expression of these beliefs as well as the certainty of these beliefs by tracking the path
taken during the decision process. A sample of 121 undergraduates was recruited from the
UK SONA subject pool. Desired religious variance was not achieved in the sample, making
interpretation of results difficult. Detailed breakdowns of these path analyses are given. Key
trends in findings are discussed.
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ANALYSIS OF AUTOMATIC JUDGMENTS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
“Seldom, very seldom, does complete truth belong to any human disclosure;
seldom can it happen that something is not a little disguised, or a little mistaken.”
― Jane Austen, Emma

Chapter 1: Introduction
Religion has been the cornerstone of much of human experience. Much of ancient
and modern human history has been shaped by religious belief. From the building of
extraordinary monuments like the Pyramids of Giza, to the divine right of kings, to the
dates marked as holidays on calendars, religion has played a fundamental role in human
culture and history. In America, this emphasis on religion has remained steadfast, with a
majority of people saying that religion is very important in their daily lives (Pew, 2015).
Though religious belief is still widespread and important among Americans, religious belief
has been on the decline in recent decades.

Decreasing Religious Belief
According to Pew Research Center, the number of people who identify as Christian
is declining, while the number who do not consider themselves part of any organized
religion is increasing (Pew, 2015). Additionally, the number of individuals who identify as
“None” on religious identification questions is rapidly increasing; this includes those who
identify as atheists, agnostics, or simply as having no religious belief (Pew, 2012). In terms of
actual numbers, representative telephone polls yield an estimate of 3% explicitly identifying
with the term “atheist” (Pew, 2015) and 11% saying they don’t believe in God (Gallup, 2015).

1

These numbers are even higher when examining indirectly measured belief in
addition to self-reported belief. In a recent study, Gervais and Najle (2018) measured
religious disbelief indirectly and compared this to self-reports. To achieve this indirect
measure, they gave participants a list of statements and asked to count how many of these
statements described them. Participants in the baseline condition received a list of generic
descriptors, while participants in the indirect condition received the same list plus an item
about not believing in a god. In both conditions, participants gave a total count of the
number of statements that were true of them. By comparing the tallies from these two lists,
identical save for the socially sensitive item about religious disbelief, the difference, on
average, was attributable to the additional item. Using this difference, the researchers were
able to compare the indirectly measured religious disbelief to a self-report from another
condition. In two nationally representative samples (Ntotal = 4000), they found that levels of
disbelief were closer to 25% (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. From Gervais and Najle (2018). Proportions of relgious disbelief from self-reports
(light gray) and indirectly measure religious disbelief (light gray). Higher values on a given
curve indicate more likely values.

Explaining the Rise
Though the reasons for this decline in religious belief are unclear, several theories
offer possible explanations. According to the thesis of secularization based on existential
security, two main components contribute to levels of religious belief: security and cultural
traditions (Norris & Inglehart, 2011). Security in this case can mean a number of different
things, including, but not limited to: environmental degradation, largescale disasters
(natural or manmade), disease or threat of disease, human rights violations, and
socioeconomic inequality and poverty. Norris and Inglehart (2011) posit that changes in
religious belief would be seen soonest in affluent societies with well-developed social safety
nets and welfare, such as Sweden, the Netherlands, and France. Worldwide, the countries
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with highest levels of state welfare spending fall in line with this prediction, with generally
lower levels of religiosity (Gill & Lundsgaarde, 2004; Zuckerman, 2007).
The social purposes that religious institutions and leaders would perform
traditionally are replaced by the secular institutions. This [component] of the thesis
emphasizes the functional role of religious belief, as a stabilizing force that offers cohesion
and order. Roes and Raymond (2003) support this claim, highlighting the cohesive influence
of moralizing gods especially in allowing large scale societies to form and grow. As society
size increases, belief in moralizing gods increases as well—to a point (see Figure 2). Once
societies reach a certain size, the increasing trend in belief reverses, with lower levels of
belief in the largest of societies. This trend is consistent with a functional explanation of
religious, with moralizing gods allowing for larger scale cooperation than would be
unachievable otherwise (Norenzayan, 2013; Norenzayan & Gervais, 2012a; Norenzayan &
Shariff, 2008; Norenzayan et al., 2016; Norenzayan et al., 2014) and then tapering off when
secular sources of stability emerge.

Figure 2. Belief in moralizing Gods and society size. From Roes & Raymond (2003). Original
Caption: "Society size and belief in moralising gods. The size of a society is estimated by the
jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local community, from 1 (no levels, i.e., no political
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authority beyond community) to 5 (four levels, e.g., large states). Data from the 1990 edition
of the Ethnographic Atlas. A similar shape found with the EA 1967, EA 1999 and the SCCS."

This relationship between stability and religious faith is bidirectional, with
decreases in perceived stability yielding increases in religious belief. Kay, Shepherd, Blatz,
Chua, and Galinsky (2010) show this hydraulic relationship in both longitudinal and
experimentally controlled studies. Their findings highlight the functional role religion and
government play in compensatory control when individuals feel they lack personal control.
God and government help individuals “see the world as orderly and nonrandom” (Kay et al.,
2010, p. 729). Decreased feelings of personal control can be compensated for by placing trust
in the government if the government is seen as stable and able to offer this support. When
trust in the government decreases and perceptions of government instability rise (e.g., after
a tumultuous election, as in the longitudinal study in the paper), this sense of control
decreases, and belief in a controlling god increases. Likewise, perceptions of increased
political stability led to weaker beliefs in a controlling god. The 2011 earthquake that hit
Christchurch, New Zealand offered further support for this in a quasi-experimental design.
Researchers collecting longitudinal data before and after the disaster were able to track
changes in religious belief based on how much participants were affected by the earthquake
(Sibley & Bulbulia, 2012). They found that while some lost faith after the disaster, the net
effect was an increase in religious belief, especially for those personally affected by the
quake.
As global economic and political stability increase, this relationship between god
and government control helps, in part, explain the decrease in religious belief observed over
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time. Another factor playing into this decrease is the second axiom in the thesis of
secularization: cultural traditions (Norris & Inglehart, 2011). Religious belief (or lack
thereof) is acquired largely through cultural transmission (Gervais & Najle, 2015; e.g.,
Gervais, Willard, Norenzayan, & Henrich, 2011; Norenzayan & Gervais, 2012b) and depends
strongly on the kind and levels of credibility enhancing displays (CREDs, see Henrich,
2009). CREDs for religious belief vary widely and can include such things as attending
religious services, following religious rules (e.g., following Kosher diet) , praying regularly
and visibly (e.g., before a meal as opposed to silently and alone before bed), and costly
religious rituals (e.g., fasting during Ramadan; see Henrich, 2009, for more). CREDs are key
to religious beliefs being passed on, and when these displays of belief are lacking, the beliefs
can fail to be passed on.
Qualitative research exploring this topic suggests that this development of religious
disbelief based on a lack of CREDs takes place over a two generation span (Lanman, 2012).
Stability occurs during or before the first generation, which experiences sufficient CREDs
needed to develop religious belief. Their stability and security leads to less of a focus on the
practice of religion. Despite having strong faith and religious belief, this shift leads to fewer
CREDs regarding this belief when raising the next generation. Due to the decrease in
CREDs, the next generation is less likely to develop these beliefs than the previous
generation. The key is not the religious belief of the individuals surrounding the next
generation, but the amount this belief is displayed in a meaningful way such as to lead to the
transmission of these beliefs. This, in turn, leads to a generation without faith who does not
display any CREDs for religious belief to the next generation, and thus the cultural
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transmission of religious traditions becomes a cultural transmission of a lack of religious
traditions, such as is seen in Scandinavian countries (Lanman, 2012; Zuckerman, 2007).
Despite the increase in religious disbelief globally and even within the United States,
levels of religious belief are frequently over reported when using conventional self-report
measures (Presser & Stinson, 1998). These theories and findings help explain why religious
belief has decreased over time, but they do not explain why a discrepancy exists between
religious self-reports and beliefs and practices.

An Issue of Measurement
In countries that have religious majorities, such as the United States, there is
considerable pressure to over report religious belief and practices (e.g., Cox, Jones, &
Navarro-Rivera, 2014; Hadaway, Marler, & Chaves, 1993; Presser & Stinson, 1998; Sedikides
& Gebauer, 2009). This is the case for church attendance both from churches’ reports of
their congregations, and even more so the case for congregants’ self-reports of weekly church
attendance (Brenner, 2011; Hadaway et al., 1993; Hadaway, Marler, & Chaves, 1998). When
attendance at churches was independently investigated, actual attendance was half the
reported numbers from Gallup polls of self-reported attendance (Hadaway & Marler, 2005).
With reporting of self-reported religious belief, a similar trend is observed. For
instance, the differences seen in the reports of religious disbelief vary a great deal. The
difference between Pew (3%), Gallup (11%) and indirect measurement (26%) may in part be
due to social desirability concerns. For starters, the methods used in each can affect the
estimates obtained. Pew and Gallup polling rely on phone interviews, whereas estimates
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measured through online surveys such as those in Gervais and Najle (2018) yielded higher
rates. The increased anonymity afforded by internet polls may lead to participants being
more comfortable self-disclosing religious disbelief. Wording can also influence socially
desirable responding. Pew’s estimate is for those who self-report identifying with the term
“atheist,” whereas Gallup’s estimate is based on those who self-disclose that they “don’t
believe in God.” This subtle difference, largely a semantic one, results in a jump into double
digits. This same wording asked in an online survey instead of over the phone takes the
estimate from 11% to around 17% (self-report condition, Gervais & Najle, 2018). Using the
same wording online and allowing participants to indirectly report their religious disbelief
leads to an increase from 17% to about 26% (indirect condition, Gervais & Najle, 2018). Thus,
when it comes to religious belief and disbelief, the specifics of the methods can influence the
estimates a great deal and it is not as simple as simply asking what or whether people
believe.

Morality and Religion
If religious belief is on the decline overall, what accounts for the gap in self-reports
and actual religious behaviors and beliefs? What motivates people to over report their
religiosity, even in an anonymous and online polls? The answer seems to lie in the overlap in
perceptions of religiosity and morality. Religion is seen as being a source for morality and
values (e.g., Bloom, 2012). As previously discussed, moralizing gods may have played an
integral role in facilitating cooperation even among strangers in increasingly larger societies
(Roes & Raymond, 2003). As society size increases, reputations become harder to track, and
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thus social loafing and cheating becomes harder to monitor and punish. With a shared
moralizing god, reputational concerns are seen as being kept in check by this supernatural
overseer, allowing for cooperation beyond the limits of smaller societies. Key to this effect is
the perceived influence of the supernatural agent over the individuals’ behaviors. Even belief
in a different god or sect can be an indicator of trustworthiness over someone who does not
believe in a god (Atran, 2004). Experimentally, being observed or even feelings of being
watched have been shown to positively influence behavior by decreasing cheating and
increasing honesty and prosocial behavior (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Haley & Fessler,
2005; McKay, Efferson, Whitehouse, & Fehr, 2011; Piazza, Bering, & Ingram, 2011; Shariff &
Norenzayan, 2007), thus suggesting that someone who does not believe in a god and who
considers themselves outside of the purview of a supernatural watcher may be seen as less
trustworthy. Religious belief, in turn, is seen as a direct indicator of trustworthiness (Tan &
Vogel, 2008), and religious beliefs are used to signal trustworthiness (Clifford & Gaskins,
2016).
Those who lack religious belief are perceived quite negatively (e.g., Edgell, Gerteis, &
Hartmann, 2006; Gervais, 2014; Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011). Atheism is associated
with a wide range of moral violations, including minor moral transgressions like habitual
lying and cheating at cards, as well as heinous acts such as cannibalism, animal abuse, and
serial murder. Even acts that aren’t strictly immoral in a traditional sense but are still
considered wrong by most, such as necrobestiality and consensual incest, are seen as being
representative of atheists because of their lack of belief in a god or gods (Gervais, 2014). This
perception of atheists as being inherently untrustworthy seems to rely on the notion that
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morality comes from religious moral foundation, as atheists aren’t perceived as
intentionally being “evil” or immoral, but rather that they lack moral knowledge because of
their lack of religious sources of morality (Najle & Gervais, unpublished data).
Atheism is a concealable identity. Therefore, in societies such as the United States
where lack of theistic belief is seen as an indicator of untrustworthiness, it makes sense that
atheists would be hesitant to disclose their lack of belief and why religious belief and
practices are over reported across the board. One option to circumvent the issues of socially
desirable responding in measuring religious beliefs is to use an implicit measure.

Measuring Implicit Belief
Implicit measures have been developed for a wide range of attitudes and beliefs that
are subject to concerns of social desirability. Given the social pressures to over-report
religious belief to appear more moral, developing an implicit measure of religiosity could
prove useful when more straightforward methods are unavailable or disadvantageous.
Defining Elements of Implicit Attitudes
Attitude formation can occur in a number of ways, most of which are unconscious.
An attitude may develop through mere exposure, such as having repeated exposure to a
stimulus (e.g., Zajonc, 1968, 2001). Attitude formation can also happen through evaluative
conditioning such as having an object or concept repeatedly paired with an object or
concept already familiar to the individual that already has a valence associated with it (De
Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001; Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez,
2010; Hollands, Prestwich, & Marteau, 2011). In either case, these attitudes can be measured
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either explicitly or implicitly. Explicitly measured attitudes are ones in which an individual is
explicitly asked to report their attitude. An implicitly measured attitude, on the other hand,
is one in which the attitude is gauged through automatic or unconscious responses in the
measure. When implicit and explicit attitudes differ, these discrepancies can be interpreted
in a few ways. It may be that the underlying structure of the explicit and implicit attitudes is
different (i.e., they do not share an underlying structure), and thus they are not presenting
in the same way in measurement (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Olson & Fazio, 2003). Alternatively,
the underlying construct may be the same, but their expression may be different. In this
case, the implicit attitude may be considered closer to the underlying construct, with the
explicit attitude may reflect the moderation of this underlying construct by conscious and
controlled processes (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, &
Schmitt, 2005). For instance, an implicit attitude may be affected by social desirability
concerns, leading to the explicit expression of the attitude to be altered from the implicit
attitude (e.g., a desire to appear devoutly religious to avoid being perceived as immoral).
These implicit attitudes may be less controlled reactions from automatic associative
activations, whereas the explicit responses are more controlled (Bodenhausen, Brannon, &
Gawronski, 2016; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014; Gawronski, Sherman, & Trope, 2014).
Cautions and Limitations
It is important when considering implicit measures to be mindful of the
interpretation of implicit beliefs and thoughts. It can be tempting when detecting a
difference between implicit and explicit beliefs to say that the implicit beliefs are, in some
respect, true or more accurate to the “real” beliefs of the individual; this, however, is not
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necessarily the case. The implicit belief may be more intuitive or automatically induced in
the individual, while the explicit belief may be more curated and monitored, but this does
not imply that one is “truer” or more “accurate” than the other. Despite this distinction,
implicit thoughts are still worthy of consideration. For instance, consider the example of
attitudes towards black men. An individual might, as a result of media exposure and
socialization, harbor implicit fear for black men. This individual might also be aware of the
bias and prejudices associated with being a black male, and they may actively work to
correct these thoughts whenever they find themselves thinking them. Despite these efforts,
they may still find themselves having kneejerk negative reactions to black men in their daily
lives. While they may have implicit biases against black men, they are also trying to correct
these biases. However, their biases may still negatively impact black men without them
realizing it. Thus, both the implicit and the explicit attitudes are important to be aware of
and consider.
Existing Measures of Implicit Religious Belief
Very few alternatives to explicit measures of religiosity have been developed in the
past. Jong, Zahl, and Sharp (2017) break these measures down into two categories: “low tech”
options and response latency-based measures. Low-tech options on implicit religion are the
sort that don’t involve extensive technology such as is used to measure reaction times. These
low-tech techniques vary from ones that pick up on religiosity of participants by measuring
the beliefs attributed to God by participants (Barrett & Keil, 1996) to how much religiosity
they read into an ambiguous scenario (Vargas, Von Hippel, & Petty, 2004). While these
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measures are useful for indirectly assessing religious belief, they lack a level of measurable
automaticity that “high tech” options share.
Response latency-based measures are more common insofar as implicit
measurements go. These techniques vary from categorization—or “property verification
measures” (Jong et al., 2017)—to implicit association tests. Very few categorization
techniques have been developed for religious belief, and most involve measuring just
reaction times on the categorization of the terms (e.g., Cohen, Shariff, & Hill, 2008; Jong,
Halberstadt, & Bluemke, 2012). The existing measures lack a sense of how those
categorization decisions were made. A few Implicit Association Task (IAT, Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) measures have also been developed for the indirect
measurement of religious belief.
An IAT works by having participants categorize target and attribute terms into
paired associations. Participants are shown a word and asked to categorize it based on
whether it is associated with one of the targets OR one of the attributed or the other target
OR the other attribute. For instance, an IAT may have the targets of Ingroup/Outgroup and
the attributes of Moral/Immoral. A given trial would ask them to categorize a term as being
associated with the ingroup OR morality or the outgroup OR immorality. These pairs are
repeated for a number of trials, then switched. Participants’ relative latency in categorizing
the pair terms is the basis of the implicit measure (e.g., whether participants associate the
ingroup or outgroup more with the concept of morality or immorality.) The ReligiousnessSpirituality IAT (LaBouff, Rowatt, Johnson, Thedford, & Tsang, 2010) asks participants to
categorize terms as “self” words (e.g., “I,” “me”), “other” words (e.g., “they,” “them”),
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“religious-spiritual” words (e.g., “faithful,” “spiritual”), or non-religious words (e.g.,
“nonspiritual,” “nonreligious”). Term categories are paired in one set of trials (e.g., self OR
religious versus other OR nonreligious) and then reversed in a second set of trials. Their
latency on the categorization is interpreted as their implicit religiosity-spirituality.
One problem with IATs is in their interpretation. Due to their paired
categorization, traditional IATs give relative latencies and lack a clear interpretation for
their latency measures. For instance, does reacting relatively quickly to self/religiousspiritual and other/non-religious non-spiritual trials (as compared to other/religiousspiritual and self/non-religious non-spiritual trials) indicate that participants strongly
identify themselves as religious, strongly identify others as non-religious, or some mix of the
two? This is a critical distinction when interpreting the implicit religiosity of participants.
For this reason, single target IATs have been developed (Cohen et al., 2008; Jong et al., 2012).
These involve the same procedure as an IAT, but with only one target being assessed instead
of two (Wigboldus, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2004). These single IATs lack the
interpretation issue, but still do not allow for the process of the categorizations to be
observed.

Measuring Automaticity of Belief
While truly implicit measures of religious belief are lacking in the field and
interpretations of “implicit religious belief” require much by way of caveats and cautions, it
is still possible to attempt to examine the automaticity of religious beliefs without making
interpretations beyond these judgements about what the “true” belief of the individual is.
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Given the role of automatic responses in associative-propositional evaluations (e.g.,
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014), and—compared to existing implicit measures of belief—
the relative interpretability of the outcome measures, the automatic responses and
categorizations of religious terms would be useful for exploring the relationship between
explicit belief and automatic processes that factor into the judgements of these beliefs.

Current Study
The purpose of this study was to analyze the automatic judgments of religious belief
by using a measure that, unlike previous measures created, was able to measure both the
latency of the expression of these beliefs as well as the way in which they deliberated on that
expression. To accomplish this, I used the MouseTracking task (Freeman & Ambady, 2010)
to have participants sort terms related to religious belief as either “real” or “not real,” thus
allowing for the measurement of both the latency of these decisions and the certainty in the
moment in making these decisions to assess the automaticity of these judgements.

Chapter 2: Methods
Measures
Implicit Measure
The MouseTracking task is a computer based sorting task. It gives participants a
series of images or words and asks them to sort them into one of two categories. To perform
the categorization, the participant drags the image or word from a starting position to the
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position of the category chosen. This task evaluates the ultimate decision of the participants
on each item as well as estimating the automaticity of the decision as it was being made. The
path of the decision from the start position to the end point is tracked, allowing for the
path and speed of the decision to be examined. For an illustrated example, see Figure 3. The
dotted line in the third frame shows a more direct (more automatic) decision than the solid
line, which wavered more before reaching the categorization decision.

Figure 3: Illustration of Mouse Tracking Task.

This task has been used to measure implicit attitudes on range of topics, including
gendered stereotypes of race (K. L. Johnson, Freeman, & Pauker, 2012), attitudes towards
people of color (M. K. Johnson, Labouff, Rowatt, Patock-Peckham, & Carlisle, 2012), social
statues cues in race perception (Freeman, Penner, Saperstein, Scheutz, & Ambady, 2011), and
gender and racial ambiguity (Hehman, Stolier, & Freeman, 2015). Even other implicit
measurement tasks have also been coded into the MouseTrack framework. For example, the
IAT has been implemented in the MouseTrack, allowing for the added benefits of the
decision path analysis in other traditional measures (Yu, Wang, Wang, & Bastin, 2012).
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For the purposes of the current study, words relating to religious belief will be
categorized by participants into two categories: real and not real. The full list of the words to
be used are given in

Table 1. These words were matched for their length across categories, with seven
words in each category, plus seven religious words.

Table 1. Categorization words for Mouse Tracking task.
Real
Dog
Pilot
Spider
Doctor
Janitor
Teacher

Not Real
Elf
Fairy
Dragon
Wizard
Mermaid
Unicorn

Religious
God
Saint
Angel
Devil
Messiah
Prophets

The task works by presenting these terms individually in a random order. The
participant is reset each trial to the starting position, ensuring that the trajectories across
the words will be begin at the same starting point. Once the trial begins, the participant is
shown the term for that trial and has to move the mouse over to the corner corresponding
with their choice. Screenshots of the layout of the task are given in Figure 4.

Explicit Measures
In addition to the implicit measure of the MouseTracker, a series of self-report
surveys were given to assess religious belief. To allow for direct comparison, the complete
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list of terms used in the MouseTracker was given to participants in survey format.
Participants explicitly marked each of the terms as Real, Not Real, or I don’t know. In
addition to gauging their ratings of the terms, measures of self-reported religious
identification were included as well as measures of religious belief and upbringing.
Demographic data also collected. The full list of the measures included in this survey are
given in the Appendix.

Figure 4. Screenshots of MouseTracker as used.

Participants
Participants were recruited from the undergraduate SONA subject pool. The
proposed sample size for this study was 100 participants, with the study run through the
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remainder of the Spring semester. The sample size obtained by the date of this document
submission was 121 participants, with data collection continuing until the end of the
semester. See Table 2 for the full breakdown of religious beliefs in the subject pool versus
the obtained sample. Though the self-reports from the SONA prescreen had approximately
16.5% of participants who identified their religious beliefs as atheist, agnostic, or none, the
obtained sample contained less than 1% (n = 3) from these labels. All three of these
participants identified as agnostic, and two of the three also reported believing in a god or
gods. A total of 17 participants reported not believing in a god or gods; of these 17, 14 said
they were not currently religious. Another 13 participants reported that they were not
currently religious, but said that they did currently believe in a god or gods. There was one
participant who reported having been raised as an atheist, but that currently identifies as
protestant Christian.

Table 2. Self-Reported Religions of SONA Subject Pool from Spring 2018 Prescreen Survey compared
to this sample.
Religion Choices
Christian (Baptist)
Christian (Catholic)
Christian (other)
Jewish
Muslim

Overall
171
179
191
3
5

Sample
42
31
12
0
2

Nones

Agnostic
Atheist
None

42
27
50

3
0
0

Other

Other

22

3

Missing
Total

Decline to answer

29
719

28
121

Theists
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Procedure
Research assistants assigned numbers to the participants based on a participant log
sheet, provided to them ahead of time. This number was entered into the Qualtrics survey
and the MouseTrack task to allow for the participants’ data from the two tasks to be
combined. Participants were given an informed consent form upon arrival. When consent
was obtained, the participant was set up with the MouseTrack task.
Before starting the main trials of the MouseTrack task, participants completed a
tutorial with their research assistant there to guide them. After the tutorial, participants
were left to complete the MouseTrack task by themselves. Participants completed 18 trials
(6 Real terms, 6 Religious terms, 6 Not Real terms), all presented in a random order. For
each trial, the participant would click on the Start at the bottom of the screen, then after
the term appeared, click either REAL (top left) or NOT REAL (top right) at the top of the
screen.
After the final trial, the MouseTrack task would automatically close, leaving the
participant back on the Qualtrics survey from the informed consent. The first part of the
survey gave them the same list of terms from the MouseTracker task, each term presented
on its own page and in a random order. Participants explicitly marked each of the terms as
Real, Not Real, or I don’t know. After completing this explicit measure for the terms, they
filled out the measures of religious belief, upbringing, and social desirability. Lastly,
participants filled out basic demographic information.
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Chapter 3: Results
A total of 121 participants were recruited for this study. Of those, one participant
was run without completing the MouseTracking task, and was as such excluded from the
analyses of the MouseTracker data.
Overall
The MouseTracker task data consists of mapped trajectories from the participants’
mouse movements as they categorize the terms from each of the trials. Figure 5 gives the
trajectories for every participant on the Real Terms (A), Religion Terms (B), and Not Real
Terms (C), as well as overall mean trajectories for the three categories (D). For these
trajectories, the paths that end in the top left corner were categorized as real while paths
that end in the top right corner were categorized as not real. The Real and Not Real terms
can be used as a manipulation check of sorts. On the whole, the Real Terms and Not Real
terms were both categorized by participants as intended. Religion Terms were categorized
predominantly as real, with some variation. Table 3 gives a breakdown for the three term
groups by how they were categorized by participants. For a full breakdown for each term,
see Table 4 for Religion Terms and Table 5 for Not Real Terms. Real Terms could not be
analyzed individually in the same way due to the fact that all but three of the trials were
categorized as real (see Table 3), and thus the MouseTracker analyzing software would throw
an error at this level of analysis.
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Real Terms
A

Religion Terms
B

Not Real Terms
C
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Mean Trajectories
D
Figure 5. Overall Trajectories for MouseTrack Task. For A, B, and C, lines represent the mouse trajectories for each term, with the
outcome represented by the end points in the top left (REAL) and top right (NOT REAL) corners. D shows the mean trajectories across
all participants.

Terms

Mean Trajectories

Table 3. Overall Trajectories for MouseTrack Task
By Participant Categorization
Real

Not Real

Real

Total trials = 720

Total trials = 717

Total trials = 3

Total trials = 720

Total trials = 576

Total trials =144

Total trials = 720

Total trials = 32

Total trials = 688

Religion
23
Not Real

Table 4. MouseTrack Trajectories for Religion Terms
Terms

Mean Trajectories

Real

Not Real

Total trials = 120

Total trials = 105

Total trials = 15

Total trials = 120

Total trials = 102

Total trials = 18

Total trials = 120

Total trials = 92

Total trials = 28

Total trials = 120

Total trials = 89

Total trials = 31

Total trials = 120

Total trials = 91

Total trials = 29

Total trials = 120

Total trials = 97

Total trials = 23

God

Saint

Angel

Devil

Prophets

Messiah
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Table 5. MouseTrack Trajectories for Not Real Terms
Terms

Mean Trajectories

Real

Not Real

Total trials = 120

Total trials = 6

Total trials = 114

Total trials = 120

Total trials = 4

Total trials = 116

Total trials = 120

Total trials = 9

Total trials = 111

Total trials = 120

Total trials = 4

Total trials = 116

Total trials = 120

Total trials = 5

Total trials = 115

Total trials = 120

Total trials = 4

Total trials = 116

Elf

Fairy

Dragon

Wizard

Mermaid

Unicorn
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Analysis of Belief
Given the religious breakdown of the participants in this sample, the planned
comparisons between theists and atheists from the study proposal were not possible. There
were no self-identified atheists in the sample to compare to the theists.

Belief in God/Gods
Though comparing atheists and theists was not strictly possible in this sample, there
was a small number of participants that identified as not believing in a god or gods (n = 15).
The breakdowns for these participants’ trajectories by term category as compared to the
participants who said they did believe (n = 115) is given in Table 6. For the two groups, the
Real terms and Not Real terms have very similar overall trajectories. Their ratings of
religious terms, however, is visibly different. Table 7 gives the ratings for the term God
compared to the rest of the Religion Terms for these two groups. The Yes group appears to
have more uniform trajectories, especially with respect to the term God. These participants
also appear to have more direct paths for their Religion Terms than do those in the No
group, especially with respect to their God trajectories.
The trajectories for the No group have more noise and complexity (i.e., wavering
back and forth) than the trajectories in the Yes group. As with the overall group, these
differences do not appear to extend into the Real or Not Real terms and are mostly
confined to the Religion terms. In other words, it’s not the case that the participants who
report not believing in a god or gods are overall less certain or straightforward in their
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categorization of the terms. It appears that this is limited to their categorization of the
Religion terms. This difference suggests that those who self-report as believing in a god or
gods may have more concrete and direct categorizations of the Religion Terms as being real
as compared to those who self-report as not believing in a god.

Ratings of Term God
In addition to the self-reported belief in a god, the participants gave explicit ratings
of all the different terms used in the MouseTrack task. Among the 118 participants who gave
an explicit rating for the term God, the majority (n = 100) rated the term as Real, 10 rated it
as Not Real, and 8 said they did not know one way or the other. Though these unequal cell
sizes also prevent proper inferential interpretation, it is possible to observe nominal trends
in their mouse trajectories. The breakdown by group for the terms is given in Table 8. The
pattern of trajectories for those who rated God as real versus those who rated God as not
real is similar to the trend in the Belief comparison. Those who were unsure about the term
God being real or not had similar trajectories overall for the Real and Unreal Terms, but
their Religion Terms are visibly uncertain. Their Religion Term paths appear more complex
and have more varied classifications than in the other two conditions. Given the small
sample size, it is difficult to say for certain, but the results seem to indicate that this
measure is picking up on their explicit measures of uncertainty about the term God.
Table 9 gives this same ratings breakdown for the Religion Terms compared to the
term God. For those who rated the term God as explicitly real, their trajectories for the term
God are smoother and shorter (more direct) than the trajectories for the rest of their
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Religion Terms. Those who rated the term God explicitly as not real had a similar trend in
the opposite direction. All but one of the participants categorized the term God as Not Real
in the MouseTrack task, and their trajectories for this term were smoother and more direct
than their trajectories for the rest of the religion terms, which they also tended to categorize
as not real. Lastly, the participants who responded to the explicit question about the term
God by saying they didn’t know one way or the other if it was real or not real are given in the
final row of these two tables. Though their Real and Not Real trials display the same pattern
as the other participants, their Religion trials seem to reflect their uncertainty on the topic.
Their trajectories are scattered and split between the outcomes for the Religion Terms, with
the term God having an especially complex looking set of trajectories. The differences in
these groups’ trajectories suggests that the MouseTrack trials on Religion Terms, and the
God term in particular, are able to track the automatic judgements and uncertainty
surrounding these beliefs.

Self-Reported Agnostics
Three of the participants in this sample reported their religious belief as being
agnostic. One of these three also reported not believing in a god. The trajectories for these
participants are given in Table 10. These participants have similar trajectories for the
MouseTrack trials involving Real Terms and Not Real Terms when compared to the overall
groups. Their ratings of Religion Terms, however, is quite different. Their trajectories
spider around the path similarly to the participants who did not know whether to
categorize God as real or not real. Given that the majority (2 of 3) of these participants
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reported that they did believe in a God and rated the term explicitly as real, it is interesting
to see their trajectories on Religion Terms appear to be more similar to the unsure group.

Raised Atheist
There was one participant who reported having been raised as an atheist, but
identifying as a Baptist now. These results (given in Table 11) are only one data point, and
thus should be interpreted as such, but they are interesting to consider. The means for the
different trial groups, especially the Religion Terms, suggest that this participant was very
uncertain with respect to the terms in the Religion list. However, the term breakdown
shows that this uncertainty was largely contained to the Religion Terms other than God,
which had a fairly straightforward path to get categorized as real for this participant. This
participant’s God trial resembles the Real Term trials more than the Religion Terms trials.
Compared to the Real Term trials, the trajectory for the term God is more rounded and less
direct, suggesting the automatic judgement for this term’s categorization was not as
straightforward or direct as the Real Terms. Compared to the other groups, this
participant’s ratings of Religion Terms appear closer to those ratings of the participants
who selected “I don’t know” on the explicit rating of the term God, but the trajectory for
this participant’s God trial is more similar to the trajectories for the group that rated the
term God as real. Though it is difficult to conclude much from one data point, it is an
interesting contrast for these two other groups.
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Attention Check
One last breakdown to consider from these data is that of the attention check.
Participants who failed to answer the attention check question were separated out for
analysis. The number who failed this check was astoundingly high (n = 54, 45%). It is unclear
why this value should be so high, especially given that this attention check happened at the
very start of the survey and immediately following the MouseTrack task. Given that the data
for this project would be almost halved by excluding those who failed the attention check,
they were left in the reported analyses in this paper. However, this fact should be kept in
mind when considering these findings. Comparisons for those who passed versus those who
failed this check are given in Table 12.
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Table 6. MouseTrack Trajectories for By Belief in a God/Gods
Currently Believe
in a God/Gods

Mean

Real Terms

Religion Terms

Not Real Terms

Total trials = 630

Total trials = 630

Total trials = 630

Total trials = 90

Total trials = 90

Total trials = 90

Yes
n = 115

No
n = 15
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Table 7. MouseTrack Trajectories for By Belief in a God/Gods - God vs. Religion Terms
Currently Believe
in a God/Gods

Mean

God

Religion Terms

Total trials = 105

Total trials = 630

Total trials = 15

Total trials = 75

Yes
n = 105

32

No
n = 15

Table 8. MouseTrack Trajectories for By Belief in a God/Gods
“God” Rating

Mean

Real Terms

Religion Terms

Not Real Terms

Total trials = 600

Total trials = 600

Total trials = 600

Total trials = 60

Total trials = 60

Total trials = 60

Total trials = 48

Total trials = 48

Total trials = 48

Real
n = 100

Not Real
n = 10
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I don’t know
n=8

Table 9. MouseTrack Trajectories for By Explicit Ratings of God - God vs. Religion Terms
“God” Rating

Mean

God

Religion Terms

Total trials = 100

Total trials = 500

Total trials = 10

Total trials = 75

Total trials = 8

Total trials = 40

Real
n = 100
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Not Real
n = 10

I don’t know
n=8

Table 10. MouseTrack Trajectories for Participants that Identified as Agnostic
Mean

Real Terms

Religion Terms

Not Real Terms

n=3

Total trials = 18

Total trials = 18

Total trials = 18

Table 11. MouseTrack Trajectories for Participant Raised Atheist
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Mean

Real Terms

God

Religion Terms

n=1

Total trials = 6

Total trials = 1

Total trials = 6

Table 12. MouseTrack Trajectories for By Performance on Attention Check
Attention Check

Mean

Real Terms

Religion Terms

Not Real Terms

Total trials = 396

Total trials = 396

Total trials = 396

Total trials = 324

Total trials = 324

Total trials = 324

Passed
n = 66

Failed
n = 54
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Chapter 4: Discussion
The aim of this study was to analyze the automatic judgements of religious beliefs.
The MouseTrack task was intended to attempt to parse out the uncertainty in the
automatic judgements on religious terms in the participants. The results were consistent
with this. The Real Terms were overwhelmingly and directly categorized as real in all but 3
trials. The Not Real Terms were also predominantly categorized correctly as not real, albeit
less uniformly than the Real Terms were. The Religion Terms had more variance with
respect to categorization and trajectories, but the majority of participants had trajectories
consistent with categorization of the Religion Terms as being more similar to the Real
Terms than the Not Real terms.
The MouseTrack task also appeared to visually track the uncertainty from the
explicit ratings of religious belief. Though the sample sizes were too small to make
generalizable statements, it appears that the participants who expressed a lack of belief in a
god or who expressed some uncertainty about this belief performed differently on the word
sorting MouseTrack task than those participants who did believe. The MouseTrack task
seemed best able to track the uncertainty in the automatic judgements the closer the explicit
and implicit measures lined up. In other words, when the explicit measure was directly
related to belief in a god or asked about participants’ rating of whether the term God
referred to something Real or Not Real, the automatic judgments on the MouseTrack
Religion Terms seemed to track more closely, especially with respect to the specific God
term in the MouseTrack task. This is fairly unsurprising and consistent with the previous
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literature on implicit measures and structural fit (e.g., Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008).
Though the results of this study were very interesting, there are also some important
limitations and caveats to consider.

Limitations
Possible Order Effects
One potential pitfall of the current design is the possibility of order effects resulting
from the fixed order of the MouseTrack task and the explicit measures. For every
participant included in the analyses, the MouseTrack task was completed prior to the
explicit ratings of the terms. However, during the piloting of the study, prior to launching
the main data collection, a number of the research assistants accidentally ran the procedure
in reverse, having the participants run through the MouseTrack after the explicit ratings
(and the rest of the survey, in some cases) were already collected. This raised an interesting
question about the potential effect of the survey on the responses on the MouseTrack task,
as well as the other way around. How might the explicit ratings be affected by the preceding
implicit task? It is conceivable that a participant might have, in the absence of other
priming, rated the term “God” as referring to something real, but when presented with a
novel task in which real and not real things are being sorted, that same choice may become
less clear cut. Without comparing the present data to data collected where the explicit task
is not preceded by the implicit, this determination is difficult to do. Due to the technical
difficulties encountered by the research assistants at the time (e.g., errors in the survey
coding, errors causing the MouseTrack to quit), complete data were not collected for these
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participants, thus this question cannot be answered in the present study. One possible
option to investigate this effect would be to include a control group for the explicit
measures by having a second group of participants complete the explicit ratings of the terms
only, or before the implicit measure. Results on the implicit measure would likely be
affected by having the participants read through the list of terms, and thus this would not
be an advisable design for the automaticity of the belief ratings, but the comparison could
be useful across the groups.
Sample Limitations
In addition to the potential order effects, the biggest and most obvious limitation of
this study is that of the limited sample. The lack of an adequate comparison group makes
proper interpretation of the findings of this study challenging. It is interesting to note the
relatively high level of participants reporting that they do not believe in a god or gods, but
then not identifying their religious beliefs as either atheist, agnostic, or none. This is
surprising considering the relative levels of these beliefs being reported in the pre-screen at
the start of the semester. It is possible that the participants in this study were different in
meaningful ways from the overall population of SONA participants from this semester. By
design, SONA creates self-selected study samples, as participants choose which studies to
participate in. Due to the self-selection aspect of SONA, this study was posted with as little
information as possible so as to avoid self-selection biases. The study was posted with the
title—“Attitudes and Meaning,” which was intended to be as innocuous as possible—and
participating information (e.g., location, duration, number of credits) only. It is always
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possible that these factors influence who signs up for a study, though it is unclear if this had
an effect on the current sample.
Alternatively, it is possible that the MouseTrack task influenced participants as a
religion prime, possibly affecting their responses on the religious identification questions in
ways that were not present in pre-screen. This concern might be addressed at least partially
through testing the order effects, as suggested above.
Attention Failure
Finally, another limitation of note that constrains these findings is the unusually
large proportion of participants who failed the attention check. It is unclear why this large
of a number of participants would fail a check like this, especially when the question was
given at the very start of the survey and immediately after asking the participants to take
care and give honest and thoughtful answers to the survey questions. Though it is difficult to
speculate what may have driven this effect, one possible interpretation is that this question
coming so closely after the question about honesty may have been confusing to some
participants. It is perhaps contradicting to ask participants to give honest and thoughtful
answers to survey questions immediately before asking them to ignore what normally would
be the honest answer to the following question and giving instead a potentially false
response. Alternatively, the timing of the data collection (second half of Spring semester
and final quarter of the academic year) may have yielded a higher than usual rate of frazzled
and fatigued students who paid less attention than would have been preferable.
Furthermore, the specific attention check question may have been at fault, with students
possible passing a different check. It is impossible to tell which of these, if any, is more likely
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for any given participant that failed the attention check. As such, this high incident of
attention failure should be kept in mind when considering the findings of this study.
Future Directions
Expanding on these findings would be valuable, especially with respect to the
sampling limitations of the current study. Future efforts investigating this topic using this
method would benefit from oversampling people with low belief and those who may be
uncertain on belief. Having more participation from individuals who have low belief in a
god and who actively identify as such would be a useful addition to these findings. There
may be ways in which those who register as uncertain in the automatic task appear different
than those who do not when it comes to how their religious beliefs are expressed explicitly
on surveys and questionnaires, but also in their own daily lives.
Beyond the simple issue of not having enough non-believing individuals in this
sample, this method would be interesting to use to explore the differences in belief between
theists, atheists, and agnostics. The current sample contained only three agnostic
individuals. In theory, we could expect to see a difference between agnostics who believe in
a god versus ones who do not such that both will appear less certain in their categorizations
of religion terms, especially “God,” but those who do not believe in a god might tend to
categorize the term more as Not Real whereas those that do believe in a god might
categorize it more as Real. This is an interesting empirical question and one worth
investigating further.
Additionally, this same sort of analysis of automatic belief using individuals who
were raised religious versus those who were not would also be interesting. I would expect
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that those raised religious would resemble one another more on religion terms than those
who were not, and that this factor would be more predictive of their automatic ratings than
would be their explicit belief ratings.

Coda
Despite the limitations and caveats addressed in this section, the findings from the
present study are still interesting and exciting. This study offers a first pass at analyzing the
automatic judgements that go into making decisions about religious belief, especially with
respect to analyzing the thought process behind judgements on whether the term God refers
to something that is real or not. This study showed that the MouseTrack task has promise as
a tool for analyzing automatic religious belief. This method and technique offer the
possibility of analyzing this level of automatic religious belief, allowing for the underlying
certainty of these beliefs to be examined on an indirect basis and, ultimately, for the
continued increase in understanding of religious belief, so fundamental a part of much of
human existence.
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APPENDIX - Survey Measures
Attention Check
We care about the quality of our survey data and hope to receive the most accurate measures of your opinions,
so it is important to us that you thoughtfully provide your best answer to each question in the survey.
Do you commit to providing your thoughtful and honest answers to the questions in this survey?
•
•
•

I will provide my best answers
I will not provide my best answers
I can’t promise either way

We appreciate your help in this research. We are interested in whether you actually take the time to read
directions. To show that you read the instructions, please ignore the statement below about how you are
feeling and instead check only the "none of the above" option as your answer. Thank you very much.
Please check all words that describe how you are currently feeling.
•
•
•
•

Interested
Excited
Upset
Afraid

•
•
•
•

Nervous
Proud
Irritable
Scared

•
•
•
•

Enthusiastic
Attentive
Ashamed
None of the above

Explicit Ratings for MouseTrack Terms
Randomized presentation to participants.
Next you will see a list of terms from the previous task.
Please read each one and classify them as things you believe are REAL or NOT REAL.
GOD
•

Real

•

Not Real

•

I don’t know

ANGEL
• Real

•

Not Real

•

I don’t know

DEVIL
• Real

•

Not Real

•

I don’t know

SAINT
• Real

•

Not Real

•

I don’t know

PROPHET
• Real

•

Not Real

•

I don’t know

MESSIAH
• Real

•

Not Real

•

I don’t know

DOG
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Real

•

Not Real

•

I don’t know

PILOT
• Real

•

Not Real

•

I don’t know

DOCTOR
• Real

•

Not Real

•

I don’t know

JANITOR
• Real

•

Not Real

•

I don’t know

SPIDER
• Real

•

Not Real

•

I don’t know

TEACHER
• Real

•

Not Real

•

I don’t know

Real

•

Not Real

•

I don’t know

FAIRY
• Real

•

Not Real

•

I don’t know

DRAGON
• Real

•

Not Real

•

I don’t know

UNICORN
• Real

•

Not Real

•

I don’t know

WIZARD
• Real

•

Not Real

•

I don’t know

MERMAID
• Real

•

Not Real

•

I don’t know

•

ELF
•

Religious Belief and Activity
1.

How strongly do you believe in God/gods (from 0-100)? To clarify, if you are certain that God (or
gods) does not exist, please put "0" and if you are certain that God (or gods) does exist, then put "100."

2.

Have you ever, at any point in your life, believed in a god or gods?
o Yes
o No

3.

Do you currently believe in a god or gods?
o Yes
o No

4.

Were you raised religious?
o Yes
o No
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5.

If yes, which religion?
o Catholic
o Evangelical or Protestant Christian
(Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist,
Presbyterian, Episcopalian,
Pentecostal)
o Jehovah's Witness
o Mormon
o Jewish
o Islam/Muslim
o Greek or Russian Orthodox

6.

Are you currently religious?
o Yes
o No

7.

What is your current religion?
o Catholic
o Evangelical or Protestant Christian
(Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist,
Presbyterian, Episcopalian,
Pentecostal)
o Jehovah's Witness
o Mormon
o Jewish
o Islam/Muslim
o Greek or Russian Orthodox

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Hindu
Buddhist
Unitarian (Universalist)
Other Christian religion
Other non-Christian religion
No religion
Atheist
Agnostic
No listed (self-describe)

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Hindu
Buddhist
Unitarian (Universalist)
Other Christian religion
Other non-Christian religion
No religion
Atheist
Agnostic
No listed (self-describe)

8.

Outside of weddings and funerals, how frequently do you attend church or other religious services?
o Never
o Seldom
o A few times a month
o Once a week
o A few times a week
o Once a day
o Several times a day

9.

Outside of attending religious services, how often do you pray?
o Never
o Seldom
o A few times a month
o Once a week
o A few times a week
o Once a day
o Several times a day

Below are a list of statements related to your beliefs. Please indicate how much you agree with each of the
following statements.
1.

There exists an all-powerful, all-knowing, loving God.
o Strongly Disagree
o Disagree
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o
o
o
o
o

Somewhat disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

2.

There exists an evil personal spiritual being, whom we might call the Devil.
o Strongly Disagree
o Disagree
o Somewhat disagree
o Neither Agree nor Disagree
o Somewhat Agree
o Agree
o Strongly Agree

3.

There exist good personal spiritual beings, whom we might call angels.
o Strongly Disagree
o Disagree
o Somewhat disagree
o Neither Agree nor Disagree
o Somewhat Agree
o Agree
o Strongly Agree

4.

There exist evil, personal spiritual beings, whom we might call demons.
o Strongly Disagree
o Disagree
o Somewhat disagree
o Neither Agree nor Disagree
o Somewhat Agree
o Agree
o Strongly Agree

5.

Human beings have immaterial, immortal souls.
o Strongly Disagree
o Disagree
o Somewhat disagree
o Neither Agree nor Disagree
o Somewhat Agree
o Agree
o Strongly Agree

6.

There is a spiritual realm besides the physical one.
o Strongly Disagree
o Disagree
o Somewhat disagree
o Neither Agree nor Disagree
o Somewhat Agree
o Agree
o Strongly Agree

7.

Some people will go to Heaven when they die
o Strongly Disagree
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o
o
o
o
o
o

Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

8.

Some people will go to Hell when they die
o Strongly Disagree
o Disagree
o Somewhat disagree
o Neither Agree nor Disagree
o Somewhat Agree
o Agree
o Strongly Agree

9.

Miracles – divinely-caused events that have no natural explanation – can and do happen.
o Strongly Disagree
o Disagree
o Somewhat disagree
o Neither Agree nor Disagree
o Somewhat Agree
o Agree
o Strongly Agree

10. There are individuals who are messengers of God and/or can foresee the future.
o Strongly Disagree
o Disagree
o Somewhat disagree
o Neither Agree nor Disagree
o Somewhat Agree
o Agree
o Strongly Agree
Religious Upbringing
The following questions ask about experiences during your upbringing that relate to religion. Specifically, the
questions ask about your perceptions of your primary caregiver or caregivers (i.e., parents or guardians).
How often did your primary caregiver(s) do the following when you were growing up
1.

How often did your caregiver(s) attend religious services or meetings?
o Never
o Sometimes
o Often
o Always

2.

How often did your caregiver(s) engage in religious volunteer or charity work?
o Never
o Sometimes
o Often
o Always
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3.

How often did your caregiver(s) attend religious services or meetings?
o Never
o Sometimes
o Often
o Always

4.

How often did your caregiver(s) act as good religious role models?
o Never
o Sometimes
o Often
o Always

5.

How often did your caregiver(s) make personal sacrifices to religion?
o Never
o Sometimes
o Often
o Always

6.

How often did your caregiver(s) act fairly to others because their religion taught them so?
o Never
o Sometimes
o Often
o Always

7.

How often did your caregiver(s) live a religiously pure life?
o Never
o Sometimes
o Often
o Always

8.

How often did your caregiver(s) avoid harming others because their religion taught them so?
o Never
o Sometimes
o Often
o Always

Social Desirability
Please answer the following questions about yourself as honestly as possible.
1.

It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged.
o True
o False

2.

I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way.
o True
o False

3.

On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability..
o True
o False
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4.

There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I knew they
were right..
o True
o False

5.

No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener.
o True
o False

6.

There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.
o True
o False

7.

I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
o True
o False

8.

I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
o True
o False

9.

I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.
o True
o False

10. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own.
o True
o False
11. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others.
o True
o False
12. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me
o True
o False
13. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings.
o True
o False
Demographics
Lastly, here are some questions about yourself.
1.

Age: _________

2.

How would you describe yourself? (check all that apply)
o American Indian or Alaska Native
o Asian
o Black or African
o Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish Origin
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o
o
o
o

Middle Eastern or North African
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
White
Self-describe: _______

3.

I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings.
o Female
o Male
o Non-Binary
o Self-describe: ______
o Prefer not to answer.

4.

What is your major or field of study?: _________

5.

Do you currently work, or study, in a STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) field?
o Yes
o No

6.

With respect to your views on social issues (e.g., same-sex marriage, abortion), would you consider
yourself more liberal or more conservative? Please select an option below:
o Very Liberal
o Liberal
o Somewhat Liberal
o Moderate
o Somewhat Conservative
o Conservative
o Very Conservative

7.

With respect to your views on economic issues (e.g., taxes, government spending), would you consider
yourself more liberal or more conservative? Please select an option below:
o Very Liberal
o Liberal
o Somewhat Liberal
o Moderate
o Somewhat Conservative
o Conservative
o Very Conservative

8.

If you are registered to vote, what is your party affiliation?
o Democrat
o Republican
o Independent
o Third Party:______
o Not Registered to vote

9.

Imagine a ladder as representing where people stand in the United States. At the top of the ladder
(rung 10) are the people who are the best off - those who have the most money, the most education,
and the most respected jobs. At the bottom of the ladder (rung 1) are the people who are the worst off
- those who have the least money, the least education, and the least respected jobs or no job. The
higher up you are on this ladder, the closer you are to the people at the very top; the lower you are,
the closer you are to the people at the very bottom. Where would you place yourself on this ladder?
o 10 – Top of the ladder
o 9
o 8
o 7
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o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

6
5
4
3
2
1 – Bottom of the ladder
Donald Trump
Gary Johnson

10. Did you grow up in the the United States?
o Yes
o No
11. Which state did you grow up in?: _________
12. How would you categorize where you grew up?
o Urban
o Suburban
o Rural
13. Which state do you live in now?: _________
14. How would you categorize where you live now?
o Urban
o Suburban
o Rural
15. Is there anything important we missed or you wish to tell us in regards to the topics of this survey?:
______________________________________________
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